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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THH STATF OF' UTAH, ! 
Plaintiff/Appellee, J 
V. 1 
FRA , i 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
s Case * 
i P 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Tin is appeal is from a convict I on by a jury of 
a y i j i a < -J L e d H h fori i i I II , m I I  i m m i I  111 I J i i H I H I n I I , i i m » i 1 d 1 j 1 1 1 1 Il II11 Il m 
C o d e Ann «, " ' 6 - 3 - 1 0 ' | I in i 
This Court has iitri sdi ot ion t< hi TIL the appeal under 
Utiji t j d u Ai J f, 'ii
 ttn{ j | , | i i, j j i i ' 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
.AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
] Di d the tria] cour t correctly refuse to give 
defendant's proposed jury instructions regarding the elements of 
to the tria 3 court's refusal to gi ve proposed jury instructions 
presents a questi on of .31 aw wh i ch i s reviewed on appeal for 
court's ruling. State v. Mincv. 838 P. 2d 648 j (356: (If I ah , - - x 
cert. denied^ 843 P 2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State .v,i Pedersen. 802 
P.2d 1328, 1330 (U t: \ .1 i" ]: | • II S S '()), c ei: t denied^ 815 P 2d 2- h 
1991). Reversal is warranted only upon proof by defendan" 
State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929f 930-31 (Utah App- 1991), rev'd. on 
other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); see also State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated on other 
grounds, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the jury instructions improperly permit the 
jury to convict defendant of attempting a reckless act? This 
Court need not address the merits of this issue as defendant has 
not preserved the issue for appellate review. Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(c); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990). When 
reviewing an allegation of instructional error for manifest 
injustice where no objection was raised below, as provided in 
rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appellate 
court uses the same two-prong test used to identify the existence 
of plain error under rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence. State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). First, the court 
must determine from the record "'that it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error.'" .Id. at 122 
(quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1987), cert. 
denied^ 493 U.S. 814 (1989)); see also State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). Second, the error must be 
harmful in that it affects the substantial rights of the accused. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922; Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utaii i ide Ar i r § 76-5-102 (Supj > 1 992) 
lit i s; 
(a) an attempt, wi th unlawful force or violence,.. 
to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immedia I: „e 
. force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantia] ri sk :: f 
bodily injury to another. 
I '" | A ' S i m J I i "'i 1 1 mi "-i"'i in ill in s d e i T i e a i i i i w 
m i ii i I IN i t <• inn i ifii ' i Kill i I i "i in I ; ' ' 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; cr 
(bj uses a dangerous weapon uo u e l i n e d in Sec n 
7 6-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death oi serious bodily i njury, 
(2) Aggravated assatil t i s a th I ::t:i el degree felony 
The tex I: c £ ai i j ::  I: he r i: e 3 e \; ai l t: :: t: ns ti tut I una J , slat Lit ui \ 
rule provisions pertinent to the resolut ion of the Issues 
presented on appeaJI :I s c ontained ei ther :it :i I the bmt\ r 
appendix c i -• brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
with attempte . ^tuu., t^u** .-t. t ~+ . second uegrv- :• 
i n i a' i t * A . *c 9 
lesser included offense > k aggravates at-t^r 
ir i^--- -- * - = - ^ +ed defendant * > - ser 
c 
presentence report (R. 11), and thereafter sentenced defendant to 
serve no more than five years in the Utah State Prison, together 
with a consecutive term not to exceed five years for use of a 
firearm, and to pay restitution for the medical bills incurred by 
the victim (R. 136-37). 
Defendant challenges his conviction and sentence, 
seeking a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During April 1992, defendant, his wife, and their four 
children lived in one side of a duplex in Salt Lake City, Utah 
(R. 298, 383, 470, 496). Jesus Rodriguez was temporarily staying 
with friends in the other side of the duplex (R. 298, 326, 397, 
438-39, 496). Several individuals, including defendant, 
testified at trial that shortly after midnight on April 21, 1992, 
defendant, his wife, Jesus, and a fourth person, Rogellio 
Quinones, were visiting and drinking beer in defendant's living 
room when defendant shot Jesus with a shotgun (R. 298, 304-13, 
331-33, 345, 353, 361, 364, 481-82, 504). The testimony varied 
with respect to the factual details surrounding the shooting and 
the motive behind it; however, the fact that defendant shot Jesus 
was undisputed. 
Defendant testified that Jesus got angry at him, called 
defendant names, and then lunged toward defendant to grab the 
shotgun he had been holding in his lap throughout Jesus' visit 
(R. 507-10, 512-15, 535-36, 547). Based on these facts and a 
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d i s p u t e d e n c o u n t e r w i t h J e s u s e a r l i e r in t h e day , d e f e n d a n t 
c Irilined lie iinh I knbnin i in 1st.111 -deLeuM- ( U • "i II "' I ""> | . 
Jesus t e s t i f i e d t h a t he thought defendant and Roge l l io 
were anqry and were qmnq to f iqh t wit.h each o t h e r because ol the 
Win"1 i'111 11II11 u y w(r> 1 " I L a ,)„k 1 m y a H i d a n 1 J n y ( III'"'" , I J I! I ."' t'" 1 - b H | Si» J e n 1.1 b 
s t o o d up, s t a r t e d t o wa Ik t o t h e I iv I ng 1:00111 door t o go IIOIIIIH ',, 
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 f aiiil inavi d e f e n d a n t shoo t him | l"(. 
3 1 i - l < \ :IJ ,„ nM/'-HJ), Ill'lie e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l l t h r e e men 
may have imbibed s e v e r a l b e e i s over t h e c o u r s e of t h e day (H 
*? ' Ti I I M 'II I  I I -I 1 ? 1 II II « ! 9 r » - S f I! 1 1  II I I in o n ] h 
J e t us t e s t i J j e d t h a t Iho o n l y bee i lie dinnk wah h a l l ot I lie t an 
he was g i v e n w h i l e a t de fendan t K a p a r t m e n t | R 31'l'ij 32 1 ? J 1 
II IIIiin Li I ^ nil 1 nil ej ii-"i I Jit \HIILJ II1 I I 11 in 1 in I In 1 1 nil 1 I I In 
down, t r a v e l i n g from h i s l e f t s i d e and s l i g h t l y beh ind luin I 
e x i t a t a h i g h e r p o i n t towarci h i s a rmpi t and e n t e r t h e r h e s t a r e a 
n n I n , - J o l l 1 111 In w i t In MI I (no l i e l, i:a 11 my I In In-"1 II 1 n 1 II y | II h " I , 
288-9h). The shot 1 ool' one inch of bone fjoni the arm and severed 
the main and ancillary arteries and veins in the ainii | V .'82-R3). 
The arm had no pulst when Jesus wc*c admitted to linn hospital 
-emergency 100m |H, 279-BU, 2Bli-B6|. Following a lengthy and 
extensive initial surqery annl twu subsequent' nn 1 qon i en, II-HII 1 s 
lett with .-' sensation ol IIho upper exLieiuity| , | 111 l Le 
motion at i _ shoulder, and no function below the shoulder (It, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's entire appeal is based on the premise that 
the completed offense of assault, accomplished by means of Man 
attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another" as defined in Utah Code Ann* § 76-5-102(1)(a) (Supp. 
1992), requires an intentional mental state. This Court need not 
address the issue of the requisite mental state because even if 
the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed 
instructions on the issue constitutes error, the error was 
harmless because, under the facts of this case, it is not likely 
that the result would have been different had the proposed 
instructions been given. The evidence in this case provides no 
factual basis on which the jury could have based its finding of 
assault on the attempt section of the assault statute. Moreover, 
there is no factual basis on which the jury could base the 
assault on a reckless mental state. Accordingly, any error in 
the court's instruction regarding the mental state required for 
an assault based on the attempt section of the assault statute 
would be harmless. 
This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's 
claim that the jury instructions permitted the jury to convict 
him of attempting a reckless act in violation of Utah law because 
defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The manifest 
injustice which may arise upon conviction of a non-existent crime 
is absent here where, under the specific facts in this case, any 
error in the jury instructions relating to the requisite mental 
6 
state for commission of assault by an attempt to inflict bodily 
injury did not affect the substantial rights of defendant because 
his conviction could not be premised either on the attempt 
section of the assault statute or on a reckless mental state. 
Consequently, defendant was not convicted of a non-existent 
crime• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED 
ERROR, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS WHERE, UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO 
PREJUDICE 
A. Introduction 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it refused to give two of his proposed jury 
instructions concerning the elements of assault and aggravated 
assault. He argues that the elements instructions given to the 
jury contained improper and inconsistent mental states which 
permitted the jury to convict him of aggravated assault based 
solely on a reckless mental state when the underlying offense of 
assault, when accomplished by an attempt to do bodily injury, 
required a finding that he possessed an intentional mental state 
(Br. of App. at 5-8). 
An allegation of error relating to the trial court's 
refusal to give proposed jury instructions presents a question of 
law which is reviewed on appeal for correctness with no deference 
given to the trial court's ruling. State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 
7 
658 (Utah App.), cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied^ 815 
P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Reversal is warranted only upon proof by 
defendant of prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in 
the aggregate. State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Utah App. 
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); see 
also State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated 
on other grounds. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
B. Challenged Instructions 
The jury was instructed on the charged offense of 
attempted criminal homicide as well as the lesser included 
offense of aggravated assault, the latter of which is at issue on 
appeal (R. 109-18). Because aggravated assault requires a 
preliminary finding of assault, the trial court gave the jury an 
instruction relating to assault which reflected the statutory 
language: 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
(R. 116, Instruction 24; a copy of the instruction is attached in 
Addendum A). See Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102(1) (Supp. 1992). 
Defendant verbally proposed that subsection (a) of the 
instruction be revised to provide that the statute's use of the 
term "attempt" required that it be an attempt "to intentionally 
8 
do" bodily injury to another (R. 567; a copy of the verbal 
argument is attached in Addendum A) (emphasis added).1 
The court also gave an instruction outlining the 
elements required for aggravated assault, instructing that the 
jury find each of the following: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant 
Francisco Tinoco assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and 
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or other means or force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury; 
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly, 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and 
without legal justification. 
(R. 115, Instruction 23; a copy of the instruction is attached in 
Addendum A). Use of the language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this 
instruction has been upheld. See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 
191 (Utah 1988); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant proposed that paragraph three of the instruction be 
modified to read 
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly, 
intentionally or knowingly, whichever is applicable. 
(R. 567; Addendum A) (emphasis added). He argued that the 
additional language in both instructions was required to clarify 
for the jury the need for an intentional mental state before they 
1
 The initial discussion of the jury instructions occurred off 
the record. Defense counsel was later permitted to make a record 
of her objections, but neither the prosecutor's argument nor the 
details of the court's ruling were put on the record (R. 566-68). 
9 
could convict him of aggravated assault based on an attempt to do 
bodily harm (R. 567-68; Addendum A). 
C. Argument 
Defendant's appeal rests on his assertion that because 
§ 76-5-102(1) specifically designates an attempt as one of three 
methods for committing the crime of assault, the attempt must be 
accompanied by an intentional mental state (Br. of App. at 6-7, 
12). He first argues that because the jury may have premised the 
underlying assault on the "attempt" section of the statute, the 
court's failure to instruct the jurors on the need for an 
intentional mental state constitutes error (Td. at 6-7). He then 
argues that because his conviction for aggravated assault may 
have been based on a reckless mental state, and the jury was not 
specifically instructed that assault committed by an attempt to 
inflict bodily injury requires an intentional mental state, the 
jury was allowed to convict him of the legal impossibility of 
attempting a reckless act (.Id. at 11-12). Both arguments rely on 
the cases of State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), and State 
v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), and the cases cited therein, 
involving Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 
(1990) (a copy is attached in Addendum B). 
The jury was properly instructed that in order to 
convict defendant of aggravated assault, it must first determine 
that he committed an assault, then find as an aggravating 
circumstance that he used "a dangerous weapon . . . or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" 
10 
as provided in the aggravated assault statute (R. 115, 
Instruction No. 23; Addendum A). Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) 
(1990). By statute, the underlying assault may be committed by 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (Supp. 1992). 
This jurisdiction has not explored the implications, if 
any, of the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the mental 
state required for application of Utah's attempt statute, § 76-4-
101, on offenses such as assault which, by statutory definition 
independent of § 76-4-101, may be completed by means of an 
attempt. Although by statute § 76-4-101 would seem inapplicable 
to the offense of assault, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 and § 
76-4-301 (1990), an argument may be made that the Supreme Court's 
construction of the attempt statute may be applicable to the 
"attempt" component of the first variation of assault.2 See, 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 provides: 
[W]hen the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state and the 
offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-301 provides: 
Whenever any offense specifically 
designates or defines an attempt or conspiracy 
and provides a penalty for the attempt or 
conspiracy other than provided in this 
chapter, the specific offense shall prevail 
11 
e.g., State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 1986) (implying, 
but not deciding, that § 76-4-101 may impact on such statutorily-
defined offenses despite § 76-2-102). However, the issue need 
not be reached in this case because even if the court's refusal 
to give defendant's proposed jury instructions constitutes error, 
the error was harmless in this instance where, under the facts of 
this case, it is not likely that the result would have been 
different had the proposed instructions been given. See State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989). 
Although the jury instructions as given in this case 
provided the jury with the option of finding that defendant 
committed an assault by any of the three means outlined in 
subsections (l)(a)-(c) of the statute, defendant's proposed 
modifications of the court's instructions, and his entire brief 
on appeal, relate solely to subsection (l)(a) of the assault 
statute. However, the jury could only have premised the assault 
on "an act" as provided in subsection (l)(c) in light of the 
evidence before it. The fact that defendant shot Jesus with a 
shotgun at close range was uncontested below; defendant, the 
victim, and two eyewitnesses testified to the fact (R. 301, 312-
13, 337, 345, 365-66, 441, 489, 513, 547). Defendant admitted at 
trial the elements of assault under subsection (l)(c); that he 
shot the victim with a shotgun (R. 513, 515, 547), thereby 
committing "an act, . . . with unlawful force or violence, that 
cause[dj or create[d] a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
over the provisions of this section [chapter]. 
12 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(c) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis 
added).3 He sought only to excuse his act on the basis of self-
defense (R. 512-15). Where the record clearly provides no basis 
on which the assault could be premised on "an attempt . . . to do 
bodily injury to another" under § 76-5-102(1)(a), the trial 
court's failure to more fully instruct the jury concerning this 
inapplicable section of the statute would be, at most, harmless 
error. C£. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 476 (Utah 1987) (even 
if inclusion of additional language in an instruction "would have 
more accurately stated the elements[,]" the language was not 
applicable to the facts of the case and its omission was, at 
most, harmless error); also Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (defendant 
was not entitled to have the jury instructed on simple assault 
where he admitted at trial the elements of assault and aggravated 
assault). Given the facts and the evidence, the jury was 
properly instructed on the applicable elements of assault, and 
any error in the court's refusal to give the proposed 
instructions concerning an inapplicable element would be 
harmless. See Haston. 811 P.2d at 930-31. 
3
 Defendant also freely admitted using the loaded shotgun to 
inflict the bodily injury, thereby admitting the requisite 
aggravating circumstance presented to the jury to establish the 
offense of aggravated assault; "[use of] a dangerous weapon . . . 
or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990); see Soeer, 750 
P.2d at 191 (defendant's uncontroverted testimony that he choked 
the victim until she almost passed out established aggravated 
assault under subsection (l)(b)); Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453, 454 
(defendant admitted that he committed aggravated assault when, in 
addition to admitting conduct constituting an assault, he testified 
that he used a club on the victim). 
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Moreover, there is no factual basis in this case on 
which the jury could find that the assault was committed with a 
reckless mental state, thereby rendering harmless any error in 
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that more than 
reckless conduct was required. While one may not be guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if the completed crime requires a 
reckless mental state, Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847-48; Howell, 649 
P.2d at 94 n.l; State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1978), 
an attempt may occur where the completed crime requires 
intentional or knowing conduct. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846, 848 n.5 
(holding that the knowing mental state required for depraved 
indifference homicide does not satisfy the mental state required 
for an attempt, but providing that the requisite mental state is 
provided by the "knowing formulation" for murder and aggravated 
murder under §§ 76-5-202(1) and 76-5-203(1)(a)); Howell, 649 P.2d 
at 94 n.l; Norman, 580 P.2d at 239-40. 
In addition to the testimony from defendant, Jesus, and 
the two eyewitnesses establishing that defendant shot Jesus, 
supra, defendant freely admitted that he shot Jesus in the arm 
because he did not want to shoot him in the body (R. 515). 
Defendant testified that he and Jesus were unacquainted before 
the day of the shooting (R. 496-97). Defendant met Jesus, 
Rogellio and another man outside his duplex in the early 
afternoon of April 21 (R. 294-95, 322-23, 368-69, 471-73, 497-
98). He testified that because Jesus, for no known reason, said 
some "very ugly words" about him, made hand signals to one of the 
14 
other men and showed him two bullets, defendant went inside his 
apartment and moved his shotgun from his bedroom to the living 
room (R. 498-502, 521, 528). Later that day, defendant had 
Rogellio over and, after spending a number of hours together at 
defendant's apartment, Rogellio retrieved Jesus from the other 
side of the duplex and brought him to defendant's apartment (R. 
297, 299, 328, 359-60, 502). As Jesus entered, defendant picked 
up the shotgun from under the sofa or against the wall (R. 507). 
Despite his earlier fear of Jesus, the fact that he had never 
spoken to Jesus before that day, and the fact that he believed 
Jesus to be drunk, defendant did not object to the visitor but 
gave him a beer and entertained him in his living room for half 
an hour (R. 304-05, 334, 361, 477, 480, 490, 501-02, 511, 521). 
Although there were no other guns in the room (R. 317, 385-87, 
418, 493), defendant kept his loaded shotgun on his lap 
throughout the discussion, once moving it temporarily to his side 
when Jesus said he wanted to grab it, and unloading it and 
reloading at least once (R. 306, 308, 355-56, 507-09, 523-25, 
529). 
Defendant testified that at some point, without 
provocation, Jesus began calling him names and "getting upset" 
with him (R. 509-12). When Jesus stood up, defendant testified 
that Jesus said, "[I]t's time. I had enough[,]" and that he 
"looked like he was going to jump on [defendant]" (R. 512-13, 
521-22, 539-40). At that point defendant raised the loaded 
shotgun from his lap, held the barrel approximately six inches 
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from Jesus' left arm and pulled the trigger (R. 514-15, 523, 
539). Defendant did not try to help Jesus after shooting him and 
did not call for emergency help (R. 530). Instead, he took the 
shell out of the gun, propped it against the living room wall, 
and went upstairs to his bedroom where he was later found by the 
investigating officers (R. 384-85, 391-92, 525-26). 
This evidence, based on defendant's own testimony, 
together with the jury's obvious rejection of defendant's self-
defense theory, reflects that defendant acted with more than a 
reckless mental state, i^e., an intentional or knowing mental 
state. Hence, the finding of an assault, even if premised on the 
attempt section of the statute, was supported by an appropriate 
mental state, and it is unlikely that the result would have been 
different had defendant's proposed instructions been given. 
Accordingly, any error in the court's refusal to give the 
proposed instructions would be harmless. See Haston, 811 P.2d at 
930-31. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CONTENTION 
THAT HE WAS CONVICTED OF A LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE 
OFFENSE, AND THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
THE HARM NECESSARY TO REVERSE HIS CONVICTION 
BASED ON MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
Defendant argues that because aggravated assault may be 
committed with a reckless mental state, and the jury was not 
specifically instructed that assault committed by an attempt to 
inflict bodily injury requires a different mental state (see 
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Point I, supra), the jury was allowed to convict him of the legal 
impossibility of attempting a reckless act (Br. of App. at 11). 
This Court need not address the merits of this issue as 
defendant has not preserved the issue for appellate review. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 19(c) (requiring that the grounds of any objection to 
jury instructions be stated with specificity); State v. Singh, 
819 P.2d 356, 360 n.2 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990). 
Defendant recognizes that there was no objection to the 
instructions below on the basis that they allowed conviction for 
a non-existent offense (Br. of App. at 12-13 & n.4). He urges 
this Court to reach the merits of this claim because of the 
manifest injustice inherent in a conviction for a Mcrime" which 
does not exist (.Id. at 12-13). 
When reviewing an allegation of instructional error for 
manifest injustice as provided in rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, an appellate court uses the same two-prong 
test used to identify the existence of plain error under rule 
103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
121-22 (Utah 1989). First, the court must determine from the 
record "'that it should have been obvious to a trial court that 
it was committing error.'" JEd. at 122 (quoting State v. 
Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1987), cert, denied,493 U.S. 814 
(1989)); see also State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App. 1991). Second, the error must be harmful in that it affects 
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the substantial rights of the accused. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 
922; Verde, 770 P.2d at 122; see also State v. Archuleta, 209 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah Mar. 25, 1993). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the attempt section of the 
assault statute requires more than reckless conduct (see Point I, 
supra), and that the court's refusal to instruct the jury 
accordingly constituted obvious error under the first prong of 
the plain error test, reversal would not be warranted because the 
record does not reflect that the error affected defendant's 
substantial rights as required by the second prong of the test. 
In light of defendant's admission that he performed a completed 
act causing bodily injury, the jury had no evidentiary basis on 
which to premise the assault on the attempt section of the 
assault statute. See Point I, supra. Neither is there any 
factual basis in this record for a finding of recklessness in the 
commission of the assault. JId. It is clear that the court's 
instruction, relating to the mental state required for an attempt 
under the assault statute, even assuming it was erroneous, could 
not have affected the jury's verdict in this case. Because 
defendant could not have been convicted of attempting a reckless 
act, his substantial rights were not affected by the error and 
his argument must fail. Cf. Archuleta, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-
19 (finding harmless an obvious error in the trial court's 
inclusion of an improper aggravating circumstance because it did 
not affect defendant's substantial rights in either the guilt or 
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the penalty phase of his trial where the circumstance was not 
necessary to his conviction or sentence). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this rpIS day of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorn^ 
^ icRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. * ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Francisco Tinoco, of 
the offense of Aggravated Assault, a lesser included offense of 
Count I of the Information, you must have found that the 
evidence fails to establish one or more of the elements of 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Francisco Tinoco 
assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and 
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury; 
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly, 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and without legal 
justification. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this 
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find that the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated 
Assault, a lesser included offense of Count I of the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^ * 
"Assault11 is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an 
impairment of physical condition. 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor1 s use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally 
or in any other manner that the actor is in control of 
such an item. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law 
or unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
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here trying to calculate. If we go right through from 
here without breaking for lunch, what time it will be 
before anyone gets lunch. I guess it will be about two 
o'clock. 
THE COURT: It would be two o'clock before 
you eat. Go in and talk about it for a minute, folks. 
All right. Counsel, I'm going to need to see you in 
chambers, regardless of what the jury decides to do. 
All right. We'll be in recess. 
(a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: We continue in State of Utah 
versus Francisco Tinoco. The record will reflect that 
counsel are present, defendant's present, the jury has 
not yet return to the courtroom, and I've asked them to 
remain in the jury room so that you can take your formal 
exceptions, counsel. The record should reflect that 
we've discussed the instructions that will be given, as 
well as discussed each one of the requested instructions, 
and I heard from counsel with regard to any difficulties, 
or legal positions that may be — may have been offered, 
but I think it's appropriate that you have an opportunity 
to take your formal exceptions prior to the jury being 
instructed. State have any formal exceptions for the 
record? 
MS. BYRNE: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
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1 I was just looking for the elements instruction on 
2 criminal homicide, but I do not have any exceptions to 
3 the way the Court has decided to include or not include 
4 the instructions. 
5 THE COURT: Ms. Remal? 
6 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I have two exceptions 
7 to make to the instructions, those are two instructions, 
8 numbers twenty-three and twenty-four. My exception is 
9 based on my belief that subsection A of the assault 
10 definition contained in instruction number twenty-four 
11 should by law contain an indication that that requires 
12 intentional conduct. And the suggestion I made to the 
13 Court in order to accomplish that was to insert the word 
14 intentionally between to and do, so that it would read 
15 an attempt with unlawful force or violence to 
16 intentionally do bodily injury to another. 
17 in concert with that, it was my suggestion that 
18 element number three of the elements of aggravated 
19 assault, instruction number twenty-three, have the phrase 
20 added to it, whichever is applicable, so that element 
21 number three would read that the said defendant did so 
22 recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly, whichever is 
23 applicable. My reasoning for that is that as we 
24 previously discussed, the case law which talks about what 
25 kind of intent is required for any attempted offense is 
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1 that it's required that it be a specific intent type of 
2 offense. And so because the subsection A definition of 
3 assault is an attempt, it's my belief that that requires 
4 a specific intent of intentionally doing bodily injury to 
5 another. And for those reasons I take exceptions to 
6 those two instructions. 
7 THE COURT: Very good. Exceptions are noted. 
8 Anything else before I bring the jury back in, counsel 
9 and instruct them in the fashion that I've suggested? 
10 MS. BYRNE: No. 
11 MS. REMAL: No. 
12 THE COURT: Bring them in. 
13 (Jury returned to the courtroom.) 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, please be seated. The 
15 record will show the jury has returned to the courtroom. 
16 Ladies and gentlemen, the instructions that I spoke of 
17 earlier have now been completed. Counsel and I have 
18 reviewed the law and the facts that apply to this case, 
19 and have prepared instructions that I hope will encompass 
20 all the information that you will need to reach a just, a 
21 fair, and a lawful verdict in this case. I'm required by 
22 law before closing argument to read the instructions to 
23 the jury. The jury is orally charged. And you will have 
24 — however, you will have the written instructions to 
25 take with you into the jury room should you choose to 
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ADDENDUM B 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 76-4-101 
CHAPTER 4 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 
Section 
76-4-101. 
76-4-102. 
76-4-201. 
Part 1 ^Section 
Attempt ' 7 6 ^ 2 0 2 -
Attempt — Elements of offense. 
Conspiracy — Classification of of-
fenses. 
Part 3 
Attempt — Classification of of- Exemptions and Restrictions 
fenaes
- 76-4-301. 
Part 2 
^ * , r* * 76-4-302. 
Criminal Conspiracy 
Conspiracy — Elements of of-
fense. 
PART 1 
ATTEMPT 
Specific attempt or conspiracy of-
fense prevails. 
Conviction of inchoate and princi-
pal offense or attempt and con-
spiracy to commit offense pro-
hibited. 
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
History: C. 1953, 76-4-101, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, t 76-4-101. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Attempted murder. 
Attempt to receive stolen property. 
Campaign contributions. 
Common-law rule superseded. 
Completed offense. 
Culpability. 
Instructions. 
Intent. 
Overt act. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Preclusion of the defense of impossibility by 
this section does not violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. 
Sommers, 569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). 
Attempted murder. 
The crime of attempted murder requires 
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does 
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine be-
cause an attempt to commit a crime requires 
proof of an intent to consummate the crime. 
Therefore, it follows that attempted felony-
murder does not exist as a crime in Utah. State 
v. Bell, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1989). 
Attempt to receive stolen property. 
Where defendant purchased property with 
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